



















studies	 of	 the	 early	modern	 European	 reception	 of	 China	 in	 collecting	 letters	
from	Leibniz’s	extensive	correspondence	concerning	China	and	translating	them	
from	 the	 original	 Latin	 and	 French	 into	 German.	 This	 multi-lingual	 and	
chronologically	organized	edition	gathers	 letters	to	and	from	Leibniz	as	well	as	
supplementary	 texts	 composed	 between	 the	 years	 1694	 and	 1716.	 It	
incorporates	 helpful	 clarificatory	 notes	 as	 well	 as	 an	 informative	 and	 lucid	
introduction.		
This	 edition	 focuses	 on	 the	 exchanges	 between	 Leibniz	 and	 the	 Jesuit	
theologian	and	philosopher	Barthélemy	Des	Bosses	S.J.	 (1668-1738)	and	other	
Jesuits	 in	 Europe	who	were	 in	 contact	with	 their	 colleagues	 in	 Asia.1	 Leibniz’s	
two	primary	interlocutors	in	this	volume	are	Des	Bosses	(selections	from	forty-
seven	 documents	 are	 included)	 and	 the	 Bavarian	 Jesuit	 philosopher	 and	
theologian	Ferdinand	Orban	S.J.	(1655-1732)	(twenty-seven	letters).	Des	Bosses	




This	 volume	 should	 be	 considered	 a	 second	 in	 a	 series.	 It	 expands	 on	
Rita	Widmaier’s	 previous	 2006	 volume	 of	 Leibniz’s	 correspondence	 regarding	
China,	Der	 Briefwechsel	 mit	 den	 Jesuiten	 in	 China	 (1689-1714),	 that	 primarily	
concerns	 the	 period	 until	 1707.2	 It	 testifies	 to	 the	 continuing	 importance	 of	
China	 in	 Leibniz’s	 thought	 that	 in	 this	 new	 volume	 only	 the	 first	 nine	 letters	
were	 composed	 prior	 to	 1708.	 The	 subsequent	 ninety-nine	 documents	 are	
dated	between	1708	and,	the	year	of	Leibniz’s	death,	1716.	These	two	volumes	
together	 provide	 the	 core	 of	 Leibniz’s	 exchanges	 concerning	 Chinese	
philosophy,	 politics,	 religion,	 science,	 technology	 as	 well	 as	 reports	 on	 and	
controversies	over	Christian	missionary	activities	 in	China.	They	are	not	limited	




materials	 such	 as	 missionary	 reports	 and	 reports	 on	 the	 Chinese	 rites	
controversy	 that	 were	 discussed	 in	 the	 original	 correspondence.	 Copies	 of	
letters	 and	 reports	 from	 China	 as	 well	 as	 Leibniz’s	 own	 writings	 about	 China	
were	 circulated	 among	 European	 intellectual	 networks	 through	 which	 the	
development	of	the	early	modern	European	reception	of	China	can	be	traced.		





West	 and	 an	 intercultural	 turn	 in	 how—at	 least	 some—philosophers	 are	
practicing	philosophy.	There	 is	 furthermore	a	reevaluation	of	ethnocentric	and	
anti-ethnocentric	tendencies	within	the	history	of	modern	Western	philosophy	
that	offers	 an	alternative	understanding	of	 its	movements	and	 figures.	 Leibniz	
has	been	seen	as	a	crucial	figure	in	this	history	not	only	due	to	his	prestige	as	a	
philosopher	 and	 his	 evident	 enthusiasm	 for	 China	 but	 due	 to	 his	 sustained	
endeavors	 during	 the	 last	 decades	 of	 his	 life	 to	 sincerely	 engage	 with	 and	
interpret	Chinese	discourses	and	practices.	The	extent	of	Leibniz’s	 interest	and	
engagement	is	remarkable	given	that	he	never	left	Europe	and	did	not	know	the	
Chinese	 language:	 one	 thread	 in	 the	 correspondence	 concerns	 his	 efforts	 to	
figure	out	the	titles	and	contents	of	sixteen	Chinese	books	that	Joachim	Bouvet	
(1656-1730),	his	 earlier	 and	most	 significant	 interlocutor	 in	China,	had	 sent	 to	
him.3	 Leibniz	 articulated	 the	 need	 for	 an	 “exchange	 of	 light”	 between	 Europe	
and	China.	 Leibniz’s	 efforts	 in	 this	 regard	might	 appear	 to	 offer	 an	 exemplary	
instance	of	East-West	philosophical	interaction	given	the	subsequent	history	of	
indifference	 and	 outright	 hostility	 that	 characterizes	 modern	 Western	
philosophy’s	relations	with	non-Western	intellectual	discourses.	
There	are,	however,	difficulties,	and	two	potential	conflicting	extremes	
in	 interpreting	 Leibniz’s	 discourse	 on	 China:	 one	 extreme	 would	 be	 to	 overly	
idealize	 this	 engagement	 according	 to	 recent	 aspirations	 and	 norms.	 The	
correspondence	discloses	how	noteworthy	Leibniz’s	engagement	is	as	well	as	its	
limitations	 and	 problems.	 Despite	 the	 openness	 and	 tolerance	 of	 Leibniz’s	
interpretive	practice,	it	would	be	anachronistic	to	construe	Leibniz’s	reflections	
on	 China	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 contemporary	 secular	multiculturalism.	 The	
other	extreme	would	be	to	deny	that	it	is	a	genuine	encounter	at	all,	pointing	to	
Leibniz’s	 reliance	 on	 the	 Christian	 missionary	 context	 that	 informs	 his	
correspondence	 and	 writings,	 and	 what	 has	 been	 argued	 is	 a	 proto-capitalist	
and	 proto-colonial	 model	 of	 exchange	 between	 East	 and	 West.4	 The	 former	
point	would	place	Leibniz’s	uses	of	Christianity	in	question	and	the	latter	would	
emphasize	 the	 practical	 interests	 evident	 in	 his	 attention	 to	 learning	 Chinese	
techniques	and	technologies.	This	practical	 interest	 is	manifest	 throughout	the	
correspondence.	 A	 list	 of	 fifty	 practical	 and	 technical	 questions	 for	 Leibniz	 on	














his	 interest	 in	exchange	between	Europe	and	China	and	 learning	from	Chinese	
morality	and	practical	knowledge,	and	the	anxiety	about	 losing	 this	possibility,	
indicate	how	Europe	is	not	yet	asymmetrically	positioned	above	China	as	would	
increasingly	be	done	 in	Western	discourses.	 Indeed,	Leibniz	advocated	 inviting	
Chinese	missionaries	to	Europe	to	teach	practical	philosophy	and	hiring	Chinese	
intellectuals	 to	 open	 schools	 in	 Europe	 to	 teach	 Chinese	 language	 and	
intellectual	 culture.	 If	we	compare	Leibniz’s	discussions	of	China	with	 those	of	
Kant	or	Hegel	a	century	 later,	 it	 is	clear	that	the	European	perception	of	China	
had	been	radically	altered	for	the	worse.	Reason	and	philosophy	are	exclusively	




Leibniz	 published	 the	Novissima	 Sinica	 (The	 Latest	 from	China)	 in	 1697.	 It	 is	 a	
collection	 of	 documents	 from	 Christian	 missionaries	 in	 China	 with	 his	 own	
preface	 that	 praised	 Chinese	 moral	 and	 political	 thought,	 practice,	 and	
institutions	 (pp.	 3-35).	 Leibniz	 recurrently	 expresses	 admiration	 for	 a	 great	
empire	at	the	other	end	of	the	Euro-Asian	continent	that	is	superior	to	Europe	
in	 a	 number	 of	 ways,	 including	 ethical-political	 organization,	 pedagogy	 for	
ethical-political	 life,	natural	 theology,	and	practical	philosophy.6	Chinese	 forms	
of	 life	 and	 thought	 indicate	 models	 from	 which	 Europeans	 should	 learn	 and	
adopt	 in	order	 to	 improve	and	reform	their	practices	and	 institutions.	China	 is	
not	deemed	an	inferior	land	to	be	exploited	and	dominated	by	the	West	and	its	
intellectual	 traditions	 are	not	 categorized	as	merely	proto-philosophical	 in	 the	
writings	and	correspondence	of	Leibniz.	China	surpasses	Europe	in	a	number	of	
areas	(natural	theology,	practical	philosophy,	and	the	organization	of	moral	and	
political	 life)	 just	as	Europe	surpasses	China	 in	other	areas	 (revealed	 theology,	
theoretical	philosophy,	and	mathematics	and	science).	
Leibniz	identifies	in	particular	the	legendary	cultural	hero	Emperor	Fuxi	
伏羲	 and	 Confucius	 (Kongzi	孔子)	 as	 the	 founders	 of	 philosophy	 in	 China.	 He	
attributed	 to	 Fuxi	 a	mathematical	wisdom	because	of	 his	 association	with	 the	
development	 of	 the	 trigrams	 (gua	卦)	 of	 the	Classic	 of	 Changes	 (Yijing	易經).	




contends	 in	 letters	 from	 1703	 and	 1705	 (pp.	 48-61),	 and	 in	 his	 remarks	 from	
August	1709	(pp.	120-123),	that	the	Yijing’s	broken	and	unbroken	lines	indicate	
a	 binary	 mathematics	 of	 0	 and	 1.	 In	 addition	 to	 its	 theoretical	 mathematical	
nature,	it	also	expresses	a	monotheistic	natural	theology	as	the	broken	(-	-)	and	
unbroken	 (—)	 lines	 represent	 the	 nothing	 (0),	 God	 (1),	 and	 their	 combination	
the	creation	of	the	myriad	things	out	of	nothingness.	The	three	great	law-givers	
(Legislatores)	 recognized	 by	 the	 Chinese	 are	 Confucius,	 Fo	 (the	 Buddha),	 and	
Laozi	 (pp.	 112-113).	Of	 these	 three,	 he	only	 addresses	 Confucian	 teachings	 as	
promoting	 a	 high	 noble	 ethics	 and	 a	 natural	 theology	 that	 parallel	 ancient	
Hebrew	religious	and	Greco-Roman	philosophical	teachings	(pp.	116-119).		
Natural	 theology	 is	 religious	 truth	demonstrated	by	 the	natural	 use	of	
reason	in	contrast	to	revealed	theology	based	on	scripture	and	faith.	 It	plays	a	
crucial	 role	 in	 Leibniz’s	 ethics	 and	 his	 efforts	 at	 reconciling	 divergent	 and	
opposing	 teachings,	 allowing	 him	 to	 simultaneously	 liberalize	 Christianity,	
separating	 its	 fundamental	 ethics	 of	 charity	 from	 a	 determinate	 form	 of	
revealed	 faith	 with	 specific	 religious	 practices,	 and	 recognize	 truth	 in	 other	
Western	and	non-Western	forms	of	religious	and	philosophical	discourse.	It	is	in	
this	 sense	 of	 natural	 theology	 that	 he	 claims	 the	 following	 two	 points:	 the	
ancient	Chinese	are	closer	to	the	truth	than	the	ancient	Greeks	(pp.	372-373),	a	
statement	 that	 presupposes	 his	 projective	 interpretation	 of	 creation	 from	
nothing	 in	 Fuxi;	 and	 the	 Chinese	 practice	 the	 highest	 ethical	 teachings	 of	
Christianity	and	are	more	Christian	than	Christian	Europe	in	the	Novissima	(pp.	
6-7)	 and	 his	 unfinished	 late	 work	 Discourse	 on	 the	 Natural	 Theology	 of	 the	
Chinese	(Discours	sur	la	théologie	naturelle	des	Chinois,	1715-1716).7	
Leibniz	 did	 not	 carefully	 distinguish	 between	 ancient	 Confucian	 and	
Neo-Confucian	 philosophies,	 construing	 the	 supreme	 ultimate	 (taiji	 太極),	
patterning	principle	(li	理),	and	material	force	(qi	氣)	as	fundamental	Confucian	
notions	of	great	antiquity	that	signify—in	his	Platonic	Trinitarian	 interpretation	
adopted	 from	 the	 Jesuit	 missionary	 Nicolò	 Longobardo	 (1559-1654)—the	
original	 potency,	wisdom,	 and	will/love.	 The	Chinese	 engaged	 in	 philosophical	
reasoning	about	nature	and	ethics	although	not	 in	a	 fixed	systematic	scientific	
form	 (pp.	 118-119).	 Leibniz’s	 interpretation	 of	 neo-Confucian	 metaphysics	
would	 be	 more	 systematically	 developed	 in	 the	 Discourse	 on	 the	 Natural	
Theology	of	the	Chinese.	
The	concept	of	the	scientific	systematic	nature	of	philosophy	would	be	
employed	 by	 the	 time	 of	 Kant	 and	 Hegel	 to	 exclude	 non-Western	 intellectual	
discourses	from	philosophy.	It	is	not	yet	the	case	that	the	West	is	identified	with	
modernity	in	a	way	that	separates	it	from	the	other	cultures	of	the	world.	Nor	is	
it	 conceived	 at	 this	 point	 as	 a	 one-way	 street	 in	 which	 the	 West	 exclusively	
developed	it	and	imposed	it	on	the	world.	Returning	to	Leibniz	challenges	such	
interpretations.	 China	 offers	 for	 Leibniz	 (as	 for	 other	 early	 Enlightenment	
thinkers	 such	 as	 Christian	Wolff,	 the	 French	 physiocrats,	 and	Voltaire)	models	









perceived	as	 the	greatest	Christian	mission	 since	 the	 time	of	 the	apostles	 and	
the	 so-called	 “Chinese	 Rites	 Controversy”	 between	 the	 Jesuits	who	 upheld	 an	
“accommodationist”	 strategy	 between	 Christianity	 and	 Chinese	 culture	 and	
other	missionary	orders	who	opposed	adapting	Christianity	to	the	Chinese	way	
of	 life	 that	 they	 considered	 pagan	 and	 barbaric.9	 The	 principal	 areas	 of	
contention	 centered	 on	 questions	 of	 whether:	 (1)	 converted	 Chinese	 could	
continue	 to	 practice	 honoring	 their	 ancestors	 or	 if	 this	 was	 a	 form	 of	
superstitious	 pagan	 worship,	 (2)	 the	 cult	 of	 Confucius	 was	 a	 religious	 or	 civil	
one,	and	(3)	Chinese	expressions	such	as	Shangdi	上帝	 (God	on	high)	and	tian	
天	 (heaven)	 were	 adequate	 to	 express	 the	 monotheistic	 Judeo-Christian	
conception	of	God.	
The	correspondence	centers	on	the	challenges	to	and	prohibition	of	the	
Jesuit	 position	 of	 accommodation	 by	 Pope	 Clement	 XI,	 a	 prohibition	 that	was	
only	lifted	by	the	Roman	Catholic	Church	in	1939.	Important	supplemental	texts	





by	 Pope	 Clement	 XI	 on	 25.	 September	 1710	 that	 forbade	 the	 practice	 and	
toleration	of	 the	“Chinese	rites”	as	well	as	 forbidding	 further	discussion	of	 the	
issue	(pp.	190-197).	
Leibniz	 intervened	 as	 an	 advocate	 of	 tolerance	 and	 the	 principle	 of	
charity	 in	 these	 disputed	 questions	 throughout	 his	 correspondence	 and	 in	




(1)	 honoring	 one’s	 ancestors	 was	 understood	 in	 Confucianism	 as	 ethically	





ethics	 and	 religion	 that	 could	 not	 be	 brought	 in	 accord	with	 true	 Christianity,	
which	 is	 in	 essence	 the	 practice	 of	 justice	 as	 “the	 charity	 of	 the	wise,	 that	 is,	














of	 Leibniz’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 Chinese	world	 as	well	 as	 how	 extraordinary	
this	episode	in	the	entangled	history	of	East-West	intellectual	history	continues	



































																																								 																																							 																																							 																														
11	-	Gottfried	Wilhelm	Leibniz,	Political	Writings,	edited	by	Patrick	Riley	
(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1998),	p.	164.	Compare	Leibniz,	
Writings	on	China,	p.	104.	
